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Executive Summary
The agrarian reform of the 1990s in Russia was 
targeted at transforming the formerly state-owned 
and centrally planned agriculture sector to a 
market-oriented one. The reform dramatically 
changed farm structure and land tenure in rural 
areas. The preconditions of the reform prohibited 
land restitution, as took place in many Eastern and 
Central European countries in transition. Instead, 
the major instrument of Russian reform was land 
sharing based on the allocation of conditional land 
shares, which were not indicated on the ground, to 
the rural population. This fragmentation of 
Iandownership was not coupled with the fragmenta­
tion of farming operations: the big farm enterprises 
were preserved but had to rent small land shares 
from their holders. Moreover, in the late 1990s 
huge agribusiness companies entered Russia's agri­
cultural sector and rented hundreds of thousands 
of hectares for cultivation.
Agricultural growth started to recover after 1998, 
but a severe contradiction between the system of 
fragmented land tenure and the prevailing large- 
scale farm structure remained. For agribusiness 
investors, the process of gaining access to land had 
become costly and prolonged, hampering the 
growth of investment, and consequently, growth in 
the agrifood sector.
The complicated systems of land registration laid a 
foundation for rent-seeking activity in land admin­
istration across the country, aggravating the prob­
lem of high transaction costs in the farmland 
market. On the other hand, the land share system 
provided the millions of rural dwellers with an addi­
tional source of income that was crucial given the 
severe fall in living standards stemming from the 
reforms in the countryside. The objective of 
increasing the efficiency of agriculture by con­
solidating land ownership thus contradicts the 
objective of protecting the civil rights of millions 
of land shareholders who were allotted their shares 
in the early 1990s.
Around this problem four groups of stakeholders 
were formed. Domestic and foreign agribusiness 
investors are interested in consolidating land shares 
in farm enterprises and simplifying the land registry 
system. The land shareholders are also interested in 
reducing land transaction costs, but most of them 
have benefited from the possession and disposal of
shares. The private firms that offer consulting and 
land engineering services are profiting from the 
existing land registry system, land transactions, and 
plurality of parties in farmland transactions. The 
land bureaucracy has a strong background of rent 
seeking in existing land tenure arrangements.
Policy makers are debating several political options, 
some of which have already been introduced. The 
political challenge raised here is a typical one for 
the policy-making process—the contradiction 
between efficiency and social justice. The challenge 
is to find a compromise political decision that 
would balance the objective of economic growth in 
agriculture, which may require consolidating farm­
land in the hands of producers [which are mainly 
large in scale], with the objective of protecting the 
property rights of land shareholders, for many of 
whom these shares provide an important source of 
income.
Your assignment is to find a political solution that 
will [1] make agriculture attractive for investors 
[domestic and international] by simplifying land 
transaction procedures, and [2] secure the rights of 
rural dwellers who received land shares through the 
reforms. Take into account the farm structure and 
land tenure systems that emerged in Russia after 
the agrarian reforms of the 1990s, current stake­
holders' interests and the distribution of political 
forces in Russia, and the possible opposition to 
change by rent seekers in the land registration 
system.
Background
Russia, along with 27 other post-communist coun­
tries, undertook massive social and economic 
reforms in the early 1990s in an ambitious effort to 
shift from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy. Agricultural transformation was an 
essential part of this transition, and one of the 
major goals of this transformation was establishing 
a new form of agricultural production.
Table 1: Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes in  Russia, 1987
Characteristic Kolkhozes Sovkhozes
Number of enterprises 12,124 12,810
Average arable land per enterprise (thousand hectares) 7.1 9.6
Average number of cattle per enterprise 1,930 2,018
Average number of employees per enterprise 354 461
Source: CSU 1988,444-461.
Production Units in Soviet Agriculture
The agricultural system of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR)1 *was formed in the 1930s 
during the collectivization process. At that time all 
individual peasant farms across the country were 
forcibly merged into collective farms (kolkhozes,). 
The estates of large landlords were usually trans­
formed into state farms (sovkhozes,). Throughout 
the Soviet era, the kolkhozes, and sovkhozes were 
frequently reorganized, merged, redivided, and 
transformed into one another, and thus by the end 
of that period they were almost indistinguishable. 
They were large agricultural enterprises with state- 
appointed managers and many employees (Table I).
The farmlands were nationalized and allotted to 
these enterprises for permanent use, free of charge. 
Kolkhozes and sovkhozes also had other endow­
ments from the state and had to produce in 
accordance with strict production targets set by 
the state bodies. Prices for agricultural inputs (such 
as machinery, chemicals, power, fuel, and fodder), 
outputs, and wages were set by the state. Farm 
profits were not an incentive for performance but 
rather merely the difference between state input 
and output prices. The major goal of production 
was to meet state targets. Naturally, such produc­
tion units could not function in a market environ­
ment.
Besides kolkhozes and sovkhozes, there was another 
form of production in Soviet agriculture. In the 
process of collectivization, the peasants had been 
allowed to keep tiny plots and some livestock for 
subsistence needs. For decades these household
1 Russia was one o f 15 constituent parts o f the former
USSR and became independent after the break-up o f the 
USSR in 1991.
farms were the means of survival for millions of 
peasants. A portion of the output from these 
household plots could be sold at town markets. 
Prices at these markets were regulated by demand 
and supply rules and were higher than state- 
regulated prices. By the end of the Soviet period, 
household farms produced around one-third of the 
country's overall agricultural output, although this 
share varied by region, increasing from the north 
to the south. Households sold less than 13 percent 
of their produce, however, and the share of house­
hold output in total marketed output was 
negligible.
The Collapse of the Soviet System of 
Agriculture
Soviet agriculture was always characterized by poor 
development. Agricultural productivity in Russia 
was very low for an industrial country, and food 
shortages were becoming an increasingly acute 
problem. In the final years of Soviet power, the 
situation with regard to agriculture and the food 
industry continued to deteriorate, with annual 
growth rates close to zero. The gap between artifi­
cially low retail prices for food products and 
steadily growing producer prices (combined with 
growing nominal household income) led to the 
need for both consumer and producer subsidies. 
These subsidies to the agricultural sector and con­
sumers accounted for one-third of national 
expenditures and were rapidly becoming an unbear­
able burden for the country. Gas and oil exports 
had been the major source of funding for food 
subsidies for two decades, so the budget problem 
was further aggravated by the drop in world gas 
and oil prices in the mid-1980s.
Intensified attempts to reform the agricultural 
sector in the 1980s did not yield even temporary 
success, and the crisis in agriculture became a 
major contributor to the country's overall social 
and economic decline. Systemic reform of Russia's 
agriculture became an urgent national task. The 
primary objectives were to facilitate a fundamental 
change in agrarian relations in order to create an 
efficient sector and to relieve the budget burden 
imposed by the agrifood system [OECD 1998; 
World Bank 1993],
Difficulties of Farm Restructuring
The transformation of kolkhozes and sovkhozes 
into market production units was hampered by a 
number of circumstances.
First, after 70 years of collective agriculture, agri­
cultural workers had become specialists who per­
formed only one functional operation in farming, 
such as cultivating land, milking cows, or book­
keeping. They had lost the capacity for individual 
farming requiring complex skills and habits. The 
generation that could run individual farms had 
gone long before the transition period started. 
Numerous polls of the end of the 1980s showed 
that no more than 5 percent of the rural popula­
tion wished to run their own farms. In addition, 
after the long period of Soviet power, land restitu­
tion2 in rural areas was practically impossible: prop­
erty rights were untraceable, documents were lost 
in the historical turmoil, and huge expanses of 
farmland were occupied by expanding towns or 
under water reservoirs for power stations. Conse­
quently, the heirs of the peasants whose lands had 
been nationalized in the collectivization process 
could not be compensated as they were in the 
majority of the Eastern and Central European 
countries.
Second, the entire rural infrastructure, including 
agricultural machinery manufactured in the coun­
try, was tailored to suit large-scale farms. Russia 
produced predominantly powerful tractors and 
wide-cut equipment; roads and engineering
2 Restitution is a legal process o f returning or paying 
compensation for previously expropriated property. The 
collapse o f communism in 1989-1991 made it possible to 
restore property in the former communist countries. 
Many countries enacted legislation to provide for the 
restitution o f both private and communal property. In 
agriculture the most massive restitution effort was for 
land.
infrastructure were adapted to the large-farm 
operations. This situation could not be changed 
overnight. Smaller, individual farms simply could 
not find the small and medium-sized machinery 
they needed for their plots. Detached from the 
parent collective or state farms, the individual farms 
were separated from the infrastructure and had to 
spend heavily to connect to power, water, and gas 
supply networks and to reach the main roads.
Third, the processing and food industry was also 
tailored to state-owned agriculture. In the paradigm 
of state-owned agriculture, there was no need for 
competition among purchasers of farm products. 
Therefore there was one dairy plant for each 
county3 and one slaughterhouse for every two to 
four counties. In the transition to the market 
system, these enterprises had naturally and imme­
diately transformed into monopolies [or more pre­
cisely, monopsonies], which dictated terms of trade 
for the suppliers. A system of farmer cooperatives 
and commercial middlemen could not emerge 
overnight.
Under these circumstances it was not feasible to 
simply split collective and state farms into individu­
al farms.
So after the break-up of the USSR in 1991, the new 
Russian government was faced with the severe 
problem of restructuring farms and privatizing 
farmland. The major tasks of this transformation 
were formulated as the following:
• to transfer farmland from state ownership 
to private ownership in a socially accept­
able and economically rational way; and




The Russian land reform and farm restructuring 
were based on a procedure called land sharing. The 
workers, as well as pensioners and social service 
officers, of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes received 
equal conditional shares in the land operation of
3 The lowest level o f administrative unit in Russia is called 
a rayon and is analogous to  the U.S. county.
the parent farms. The conditional shares were not 
marked on the ground and were to be considered 
as options. The holder had the right to withdraw 
with a physical plot at any time, without the per­
mission of the other land shareholders; only the 
location of the plot had to be agreed upon. These 
land shares were transferable in all types of legal 
transactions and were inheritable. A person who 
accumulated a certain number of land shares could 
request from the parent farm a plot or plots of 
land equal to the total nominal size indicated in the 
shares.
In the reform of 1992-1994, around 12 million such 
shares were allotted to rural dwellers. The average 
size of the land shares varied significantly from 
region to region owing to uneven population 
density in different parts of Russia, but across the 
country shares averaged about six hectares. Because 
of the system of legally allowed land share transac­
tions, the average size of family farms was bigger 
than one share—around 40 hectares per farm.
About 300,000 households exercised their right 
to withdraw from the farm enterprises and set up 
their own family farms. In the first years of the 
reforms, many people quickly withdrew from the 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes, but later the process 
stagnated, mainly owing to the reasons mentioned 
in the previous section (Table 2).
The rest of the rural dwellers preferred to maintain 
their original status as members of the kolkhozes 
and sovkhozes. In most cases they rented their land 
shares to the farm enterprises. Shareholders also 
had the option of contributing their land shares to 
the equity of these farms. In this case the share­
holder would lose the right to claim a physical plot 
and instead become a shareholder of a joint stock 
company or co-op, but in practice shareholders 
rarely exercised this option.
The former kolkhozes and sovkhozes were gradu­
ally transformed into various types of business 
organizations. Originally the managers, workers, 
and pensioners owned these enterprises, but over 
time control of the stock was increasingly concen­
trated in the hands of top managers, and the 
enterprises were later acquired by outsiders.
Because of the country's weak legal culture and law 
enforcement, as well as its federal structure,4 the 
land-sharing arrangements were inadequately regis­
tered. The shareholders were not aware of the 
benefits and responsibilities of possession, and the 
farm enterprises that truly used the lands did not 
pay for this use. Moreover, lands shares that were 
leased to large farm enterprises were not identified 
on a map.
This situation changed slightly after a 1996 presi­
dential decree obliged all users of land to sign legal 
contracts with the owners of the land shares. Since 
then, the average size of individual farms has grown 
through the leasing of land shares. There are no 
official data on land share transactions among farm 
enterprises, but anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this process has occurred as well. Obliged to sign 
the formal lease contracts, the land shareholders 
were encouraged to choose better lease conditions. 
As such, a quasi-market for land shares sprang up.
Further development of the situation occurred 
after a financial crisis in 1998. The fourfold Russian 
ruble devaluation caused a notable trend toward 
import substitution and led to significant growth in 
agriculture during the following years. Thanks to 
this growth, potential investors considered land 
more valuable and demand for land rose. Under 
these circumstances the conditional character of 
land shares played a positive role in the develop­
ment of the land market. Attracted by high net 
returns in agriculture, the external farming sector 
investors began to acquire farmland for operation. 
On the other side, the rural dwellers who were land 
shareholders had become aware of the value of 
their land and thus preferred not to sell their 
shares but to rent them advantageously. Therefore, 
the leasing of land shares became a major form of 
land acquisition in this period.
4 Land tenure issues are a subject o f both federal and 
regional legislation, and at the beginning o f the reforms, 
a number o f regions did not establish land-sharing 
arrangements on their territories.
Table 2 : Developm ent o f  Fam ily Farm s in  Russia, F irs t Years o f  the Reform
Characteristic 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Number of family farms 
(thousands]
49 182 270 279 280.1 279 274
Average size of plot (hectares] 41 42 43 43 43 44 48
Share of family farms in land use 
(%]
3.4 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.8
Share of family farms in gross 
agricultural output, (%]
1 2 2 2 2 2.1
Source: Calculated from Russian Cadastre Service data. 
N o te :... indicates negligible.
Farm Structure
In this post-crisis period a new form of producer 
emerged that is quite different from the main types 
of agricultural producers in other post-Soviet 
economies. These are the large farm operations [up 
to 300,000 hectares in several regions—much 
bigger than traditional Soviet kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes and their current heirs] established with 
capital derived from outside the primary sector. 
Sometimes capital comes from a downstream sector 
[like processors, retailers, or middlemen] whose 
purchasers of agricultural raw materials want to 
invest in secure and reliable supplies. Sometimes it 
comes from an upstream sector (like manufacturers 
and suppliers of resources and services for the 
farming sector] whose suppliers tend to control the 
costs of inputs. Often capital originates completely 
outside the agrifood sector—mainly from the most 
profitable sectors of the Russian economy, such as 
fuel and energy, finance, and metallurgy. In some 
cases a holding company owns several farm enter­
prises, and in others the farm enterprise itself is 
simply one huge enterprise. Sometimes such com­
panies are organized under the control of and with 
the participation of the regional or local administra­
tion. In the majority of cases, however, a large farm 
operation is a purely private initiative. Management 
structure differs tremendously from company to 
company. Land tenure arrangements also vary: a
company may own huge areas, but more often they 
rent land shares that make up huge areas.
Thus, the land share system provided large farm 
companies with easy access to land. If the farmland 
had been divided into physical plots during the 
land reform, the big companies, which each now 
lease hundreds of thousands of hectares in several 
regions, would need to divert their finances from 
investments in productive activities to investments 
in land consolidation. Under current arrangements 
they can accumulate a large number of leased 
shares and then claim the lands of the corre­
sponding farm enterprises for allocation in physical 
form, which allows them to get these lands in big 
fragments. Also the land share lease provides the 
local rural population with a certain level of sub­
sistence. Given that about 60 percent of land 
shares belong to the elderly, rental of land shares 
provides an additional safety net system in rural 
areas.
So in the initial stages of reform, the agricultural 
system in Russia changed dramatically. As Figure 1 
shows, currently 65 percent of farmland in Russia is 
privately owned (if land shares are considered 
private ownership] and 38 percent is owned by the 
state and municipalities.
Figure 1: Farm land Ownership Structure in  Russia> January 1, 2 0 0 4  (%>)
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Source: Shagaida 2005
As in many other post-communist countries, 
Russia's agriculture is based on three types of 
production units: (I] large-scale farm enterprises, 
the successors of kolkhozes and sovkhozes and 
various related farming companies; [2] individual 
farms, which are presumably possessed and run by 
one family; and (3) household plots of the rural 
and, to a minor extent, the suburban and urban 
population (these are tiny plots of land presumably 
used for subsistence food production, with some 
sales of surpluses over family needs]. These types 
of production units are legally defined mainly by 
their form of registration. Large-scale farms are 
incorporated in one form or another; individual 
farms are specifically registered as such; and house­
hold plots, which are exempt from both business 
registration and taxation, are defined in terms of 
the documented allotment of a physical plot of 
land.
Weak legal and statistical definitions of these three 
types of farming entities do not allow them to be 
distinguished by physical size and economic turn­
over. Thus, some individual farms operate 3 ,0 0 0 -
5,000 hectares and employ more than 100 people, 
making them comparable in size to the typical 
Russian incorporated farm. On the other hand, 
some individual farms have no land under cultiva­
tion or pasture but are registered as individual 
farms and count as such in the statistics. According 
to the 2006 Agricultural Census, more than 30 
percent of individual farms in Russia operate more 
than 2,000 hectares of farmland, whereas 17 per­
cent have no land at all. In addition, there is little 
difference in actual ownership between these two
types. A "large-scale" farm can be controlled by a 
single individual, whereas an "individual farm" is 
often owned as a partnership or even owned jointly 
and severally by unrelated persons. Because house­
hold plots are exempt from taxation, many owners 
of market-oriented small farms pretend that they 
own household plots, although in reality they culti­
vate 50-100 hectares of arable land.
Household plots accounted for more than half of 
total agricultural output in 2000, up from 30 
percent in 1990. "Households," however, is not a 
homogeneous category: it amalgamates a number 
of dissimilar producers. From 40 to 70 percent of 
households generated barely 5 percent of the gross 
agricultural output of the corresponding county. 
These are very small subsistence farms with an 
average of 0.06 hectare and two head of cattle. The 
top 20 percent of households in some areas 
produce up to 25 percent of the gross agricultural 
output of the corresponding county, and these 
farms have an average of 30-40  hectares and 
sometimes exceed 100 head of cattle [Serova 2006], 
These latter farms are considered household plots 
but are presumably run by market-oriented, com­
mercial producers who do not register as individual 
farms in order to avoid taxation and to obtain 
concessional services from an adjacent, large-scale 
"mother" farm.
Problems with Reforms
The agrarian reform of the 1990s led to a number 
of problems for the further development of the 
sector.
First, the reform led to a situation in which agricul­
tural businesses and the land operated by the busi­
nesses belonged to different groups of owners. The 
farming companies leased their lands from a large 
number of land shareholders. An individual land 
shareholder could break a rent contract at almost 
any time, making agribusiness risky and discourag­
ing agribusinesses from making land improvements 
and long-term investments. Also, the process of 
collecting shares and contracting with such a large 
number of holders increased the farming com­
panies' transaction costs. Thus, for an operation of
100.000 hectares (a common size for large agricul­
tural companies in southern Russia), the managers 
had to arrange legal contracts with about 15,000-
20.000 people. The lack of a well-functioning legal 
system made registration procedures a nightmare 
for involved parties [Shagaida 2005).
Second, the fact that agribusinesses did not own 
the land prevented them from using it as collateral 
for bank loans, thereby reducing the potential of 
agriculture to attract borrowed capital for long­
term investment projects.
Third, because of the land share system, a buyer 
who purchased a large farm enterprise did not 
know the final result of his or her purchase. In the 
formal deal only nonland assets could be acquired; 
land arrangements remained uncertain. After pur­
chasing the farm, the new owners have to arrange 
new land lease contracts with all of the land share­
holders. This system generated much uncertainty
Figure 2 : M ineral Fertilizer Use, 1 9 9 0-20 02
for would-be investors and discouraged them from 
making purchases.
Together, these three problems significantly 
reduced the capital inflow to agriculture, which 
desperately needed investment for modernization, 
and hampered the sector's potential growth. Agri­
cultural productivity, low during the Soviet era, 
deteriorated even further during the transition 
period because of a financial crisis that led to 
severe decapitalization of farms and dramatic reduc­
tions in input use, as illustrated by fertilizer use 
[Figure 2).
Fourth, the conditional nature of the land shares 
helped the land turnover mechanism, but also set 
up insoluble problems for land registration. The 
physical plot allotted for the purpose of renting a 
particular land share could be identified differently 
depending on the entity that rented this land. Thus, 
if a land shareholder rented his or her share for a 
year to a farmer located in the same village, then a 
physical plot near this village would be allotted. If 
the same land shareholder rented his or her share 
the following year to a large farming company that 
set up its operation in a remote area, then the 
physical plot would be allotted close to this opera­
tion. This system was a disaster for maintaining a 
land registry, but land registration is a necessary 
element of transparent and efficiently functioning 
land market [Shagaida 2005).
Total fertilizer applied ------ Fertilizer applied per hectare
Source: Serova and Shick 2005.
Now policy makers in Russia are faced with the 
challenge of further reforming the land tenure 
system within the given farm structure.
Stakeholders
Many groups of interests with different political 
power are involved in solving the land tenure 
problem in Russian agriculture. One of the major 
stakeholder groups consists of the owners of big 
farming enterprises. Since 1998 Russia's agriculture 
has grown quickly and attracted investment from 
outside the sector [Figure 3). The external investors 
are interested in easier access to land, given the 
current long and costly process of leasing small 
shares from thousands of holders. These external 
investors belong to the strongest financial and
industrial groups in the Russian economy, including 
the largest mineral oil companies, metallurgy com­
panies, railways, and banks. These companies have 
substantial lobbying power and can promote 
political decisions in their favor.
Apart from domestic investors, there are growing 
investments from international companies into the 
Russian agrifood sector and primary agriculture 
[Figure 4], Foreigners are not allowed to own 
farmland in Russia, in accordance with Russian 
legislation, but they can be the co-owners of 
farming enterprises with Russian partners who do 
own land. Thus, foreign agribusiness investors in 
Russia are also interested in consolidating land in 
the equity of farming enterprises and in simplifying 
large investors' access to land.
Figure 3 : D irect Investm ents in  the A g rifo o d  Sector in  Russia> 1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 5 [billions o f rubles in  
constant 1995prices]
Figure 4 : Foreign Investm ents in  A gricu ltu re  in  Russia> 1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 5 [m illions o f U S . dollars]
Source: Calculated from Federal State Statistics Service data.
Another group of stakeholders consists of owners 
of individual farms, which vary dramatically by 
physical and economic size. The biggest individual 
farms accumulate their lands by renting shares, just 
as the big farming enterprises do, and therefore 
they have the same interest in land tenure devel­
opment. Politically, however, the owners of individ­
ual farms are poorly organized and can hardly 
lobby for their interests.
The land shareholders constitute the most numer­
ous group of stakeholders in this process, but they 
are extremely heterogeneous. Some shareholders 
have already made their decision about how to dis­
pose of the shares. They had a choice between 
withdrawing with their physical plot and establish­
ing their own farm, renting or selling their share, 
or contributing the share to the equity of a farm­
ing enterprise. Most of the land shares have been 
transformed into plots during the years of reform. 
Thus, future reform of land legislation can affect 
only those shareholders whose shares are rented 
out and whose rights to these shares can be trun­
cated by changes in legislation. The shareholders 
are disconnected geographically, have no political 
unity, and probably will not be able to argue 
strongly for their interests.
There is one more group of stakeholders that 
includes the officers of the national land registry 
and the employees of the commercial land engi­
neering companies and land consulting companies. 
Complicated procedures for registering land trans­
actions create demand for the services of private 
consultants and land engineers. Moreover, these 
procedures also lay the foundation for rent-seeking 
activities by government officers involved in the 
land registration process. This group will likely 
oppose radical changes in the system.
Policy Options
The first and most obvious option, which was 
partially implemented in legislation of the early 
2000s, is to stop renting land shares. Before rental, 
the conditional land share should be withdrawn 
from use by the parent farm, identified on the 
ground, and registered as a physical plot. Only 
after that should it be rented out. If several land 
shareholders are intending to rent their plots
together to the same renter, they should undertake 
land consolidation.
A consequence of this option is that individual 
shares are not requested for rent because the big 
farming companies are the major leasers of the land 
shares. Land shareholders thus actually lose the 
right of individual rent. Most often the entire 
group of co-owners of land within one former 
kolkhoz or sovkhoz rents its shares out together. 
Individuals lose their share of the rent payments 
because the group decides collectively how to use 
these receipts. As a result the safety net role of the 
land share system is destroyed. In addition, the 
leaders of the group get a special role in the rent 
negotiation process, a practice that clears the way 
for fraud and rent-seeking activity [or "under the 
table" deals] that also reduce rent revenues for the 
ordinary land shareholders.
On the other hand, the legal requirements for 
preliminary land allotment, identification on a map, 
and registration increased the transaction costs for 
land rental enormously. These costs are not afford­
able for the shareholders and usually are under­
taken by the leasers, who are large companies. 
These companies thus face increased costs to gain 
access to land and consequently a reduction of 
potential investments in production.
New land legislation in the early 2000s made land 
turnover much more difficult. Today, big investors 
tend to buy farm operations from other big com­
panies that have completed all the necessary legal 
arrangements or from the state or municipalities.
Other debated policy options are related to the 
different ways of depriving land shareholders of 
their ownership. There is a certain rationality to 
this seemingly unfair proposal. Many agricultural 
enterprises are in serious need of investment. 
Around 40 percent of farm enterprises in Russia 
consistently operate at a loss. Consequently the 
wages of employees on such farm enterprises are 
low and irregularly paid; furthermore the poor per­
formance of these enterprises leads to the deteri­
oration of the entire rural infrastructure around 
them and a decline in the living standards in nearby 
villages. Under these circumstances land share­
holders do not get the benefits of their land 
ownership. Consolidation of their lands in the
equity of farm enterprises could make these enter­
prises more attractive for external investors. The 
inflow of investments and better management could 
improve not only farm performance and employee 
wages, but also rural life in the surrounding area. 
So even if they lose the property rights associated 
with their land shares, the shareholders could ulti­
mately benefit anyway.
The Constitution and general principles of justice 
do not, however, allow policy makers to truncate 
the rights of the citizens once given. In the reform 
process 12 million rural dwellers received land 
shares. Some of these shareholders disposed of 
their shares successfully: some established their 
own farms and run them efficiently; some invested 
their shares in well-performing big farm enterprises 
and receive dividends or rent; some sold their 
shares and used the capital for other purposes. 
How successfully shareholders were able to dispose 
of their land shares did not depend exclusively on 
personal choice; much was determined by the 
region where the share was located [in marginal 
areas there were few options for using land shares 
efficiently], by the performance of the parent farm 
enterprise, by regional policy [in some regions 
share allocation was postponed by the local admin­
istration], and other factors. Under such circum­
stances it would be unfair and politically unaccepta­
ble to dispossess all these shareholders. Thus the 
major political challenge on this issue in Russia is 
achieving a compromise between the efficiency of 
agriculture and social justice in rural areas.
Assignment
Your assignment is to find a political solution that 
will [1] make agriculture attractive for investors 
[domestic and international] by simplifying land 
transaction procedures, and [2] secure the rights of 
rural dwellers who received land shares through the 
reforms. Take into account the farm structure and 
land tenure systems that emerged in Russia after 
the agrarian reforms of the 1990s, current stake­
holders' interests and the distribution of political 
forces in Russia, and the possible opposition to 
change by rent seekers in the land registration 
system.
Additional Readings
Giovarelli, R., and D. Bledsoe. 2001. Land reform in 
Eastern Europe: Western CIS, Transcaucasus, 
Balkans, and E U  accession countries. Rome: 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations.
Lerman, Z., C. Csaki, and G. Feder. 2004. Agricul­
ture in transition: Land policies and evolving 
farm structure in post-Soviet countries. 
Lanhan, MD, USA: Lexington Books.
Northworthy, A., ed. 2000. Russian views of the 
transition in the rural sector. Washington, DC: 
World Bank
Serova, E. 2005. Agri-food economy: Today and 
tomorrow. In F. Lees and B. Milner, eds., Russia 
Inc. Lanham, MD, USA: University Press of 
America.
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